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1INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing use of game
theory in psychological research. Suppes and Atkinson (I960)
have demonstrated the similarities between game theory and
the Estes Stimulus Sampling model often employed for predict-
ing and interpreting two-choice learning data. Other psy-
chologists, including Deutsch (1958). Hoffman, Pestinger, and
Lawrence (195^), and Thibaut and Kelley (1959), have employed
games in discussing and investigating various social struc-
tures and processes.
In their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (19^^) mathematically proved that for
certain games a strategy exists which would assure players a
minimal gain or loss. This proof was based on the economist's
concept of "expected utility" which may be defined as the at-
tractiveness of the consequences of a behavior to the indi-
vidual.
Below is an example of a 3 x 3 two-person game. Both
players, A and B, have three alternative choices (rows and
columns respectively). The combination of their choices de-
termines the outcome of an event (cell). If player A were to
choose alternative a^ and player B, b^^, event a^b^ would
occur and player A would win 11 utiles and player B would
lose 11 utiles. Likewise, if player A were to choose alter-
native a3 and player B. bg, event a3b2 would occur and
player
A would lose h utiles and player B would win k utiles. This
is called a zero-sum game since the amount one player wins,
the other player loses.
If player A were to choose alternative a-^ in the game
below, he could win 1 or 2 utiles, depending on what column
player B selected. Player A's poorest outcome for row a^ is
therefore a 1 utile gain. Similarly, hia poorest outcome for
rows 2 and 3 respectively are -12 and -4 utiles. Player B's
poorest outcomes for columns h^, and b^, are -11, -1, and
-23 utiles. Therefore player A can assure himself of winning
at least 1 utile by choosing alternative a-^. This is called
his maximin alternative because it maximizes his minimum gain.
Player B can assure himself of losing no more than 1 utile by
playing alternative b2. This is called his rainimax alterna-
tive because it minimizes his maximum loss. The combination
of these choices determines cell a^^bg which yields the payoff
of 1 utile to A and the loss of 1 utile to B. Thus this game
contains a saddle point, a cell which minimizes one player's
loss while at the same time maximizing the other's minimum
gain. Such a game is called "Strictly Determined."
Player B
bi bo b-^ Maximin Outcomes
ai 2 1 1
Player A aa -12 -7 23
a3 11 8
( Hows
)
1*
-12
Minimax Outcomes -H
(Columns
)
*Largest Row Minimum » Maximin
**Smallest Column Maximum = Minimax
3Little research has been conducted on the above class of
games. The bulk of decision making research has dealt with
games which permit some degree of cooperation. Thibaut and
Kelley (1959), for example, have attempted to translate char-
acteristics of small groups such as power, dependence, and
status into the reward-cost language of game theory. They
have done this by structuring the reward-cost matrix in such
a way as to give one person varying control over the rewards
of the other. Similarly, Wilson (I960) has investigated
forms of social control by varying the structure and
payoffs
of two-person games. Hoffman, Pestinger, and Lawrence
(195*^-)
have studied the tendency of members within a group to com-
pare their performance with that of other members in
competi-
tive bargaining situations by examining the effect of
peerage,
and importance of task upon the formation of coalitions
in
three-person games. Deutsch (1958) and more recently Solomon
(I960) employed two-person games to investigate interpersonal
trust.
Lleberraan (1958, 1959) has studied game behavior in more
competitive situations which conformed to the model
outlined
above. He employed both 2 x 2 and 3 x 3 strictly
determined
games and found that Ss did learn to play a minimax
strategy.
In the latter study, pairs of Ss played a single
game for 200
trials. In this situation both Ss' minimax strategy
was to
always play choice (row. column) 3- The question arises
as
to whether the Ss learned the concept of a
minimax solution
which might be transferred to other similar games or merely
learned that choosing the bottom row in this particular game
yielded the greatest reward, i.e., simple discrimination or
"position habit."
Other investigators (Estes, 1957; Atkinson and Suppes,
1958) have reported that Ss did not behave in accord with
predictions based on the game model. However, these investi-
gations can not be considered adequate tests of the predic-
tive power of the model in that In neither case were the as-
sumptions of the model strictly satisfied. In the Testes
study the payoff in a 2 x 2 situation was merely an acknowl-
edgment of whether the player was right or wrong. Further-
more, the payoffs for any combination of choices were not
certain or even defined for the players, but rather a proba-
bility. That is, if player one selected choice 1 and player
two selected choice 2, player one would be told he was cor-
rect 50% of the time and player two would be told he was cor-
rect 50% of the time. In the Atkinson and Suppes study the
players were not aware of the payoff matrix, nor were they
directly informed of the responses of the other player.
Estes (1957) and Atkinson and Suppes (1958) have argued
that the game model is not a behavior theory since it does
not describe how behavior is modified through the game expe-
rience of the individual. Luce and Raiffa in their book
Games and Decisions (1957) have cautioned that game theory is
not descriptive of behavior, but is a normative theory. It
5does not describe how individuals play, it suggests a method
of play for the achievement of certain goals. However, the
question of v^hether or not do choose a minimax strategy or
under what conditions they approximate such behavior is an
empirical one, one which has not been adequately investi.^ated
in the studies cited above. The present study deals with
this question.
The Model
The model under investigation in this study can be de-
scribed by the following statements:"^
1) Each player is presented with a finite number of
alternatives.
2) The games are by nature zero-sum.
3) The games are strictly determined.
k) Each player knows the alternatives available both to
hira and to his opponent, and he knows the outcome depends
upon these choices, i.e., he knows the game matric and its
functions.
5) The outcomes of the games are "certain," i.e., the
outcome for any combination of opponents* choices is exactly
represented in the game matrix.
1. Von Neumann and Morgenstern employed the concept of
utility as cell payoffs. In this study the payoffs are poker
chips which are transferable for money. Thus this study can
not be considered a strict test of the Von Neumann and
?1orgenstern theory.
66) It is assumed that each player has a preference
ordering over these outcomes, and he knows his opponent's
preference pattern for the outcomes.
Variables to be Considered
A person's strategic decision is not solely a function
of the game matrix. It seems reasonable to assume, and
Lieberraan's (1958, 1959) data would indicate that such a de-
cision would also be a function, among other things, of 1) an
opponent's strategy, 2) an individual's expectation of his
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opponent's strategy, and 3) the value of the game. The pur-
pose of the present study is to investigate the effects of
these three variables on the use of minimax and other strate-
gies in games consistent with the model described above.
Opponent ' s Strategy
When playing competitive games, a player's decision is
seldom based upon the structure or nature of the game alone.
Explicitly or implicitly, the player may make some assumption
about how his opponent is playing.
In the Lieberman studies (1958, 1959) discussed above,
two Ss were required to play against each other. Lieberman
did not control either strategy to determine how persons
2. The value of a strictly determined zero-sum game is
defined as the magnitude of the payoff in the saddle point
cell.
7would play against specific experimentally defined strategies.
In the present study, Ss play against one of two experimen-
tally defined strategies; random or minimax. They are also
provided with three distinct choices, each structured so as
to provide a logical alternative strategy a priori ; a miniraax
choice, a choice in which the average of the payoffs in that
row is the greatest of the three alternative rows, and a row
which contains the cell with the highest payoff in the matrix.
When playing against a minimax strategy Ss should learn
to play their own minimax. Two factors would lead to this
expectation. First, if Ss play anything but a miniraax alter-
native against a miniraax opponent they will lose. Second, if
Ss are able to note what E plays they will note that he always
plays his miniraax and their logical counter choice is their
own minimax alternative.
Those Ss who play against a random opponent will attain
a net gain by choosing either the minimax or the high average
row. Since the latter is more profitable, it is predicted
that this group will choose the high average row more often
than any other. However, since there is an alternative
(miniraax) which offers some gains, the high average should
not be as often chosen by this group as the miniraax should be
by Ss playing against a minimax strategist. Furthermore, Ss
playing against a minimax strategist should adopt their
strategy more rapidly and utilize it more consistently over
trials. This prediction is based on the assumption that Ss
8will be influenced by the knowledge of their opponent's
choices, an assumption supported by various sequential choice
studies (e.g., Anderson, I960). In the case of the Ss who
play against a rainiinax opponent, knowledge of the opponent's
choices should facilitate the development of a minimax
strategy. In the case of the Ss who play against a random
opponent, such knowledge should hinder the development of any
consistent strategy.
Expectation of Opponent ' s Strategy
It is reasonable to assume that an individual's game
strategy is in part a function of the strategy he thinks his
opponent is employing. There is much psychological evidence
that demonstrates that a person behaves in accordance with
his expectations about other people. Hyman (1955)i for ©^c-
ample. Indicates that responses during interviews are influ-
enced by the interviewee's concept of the interviewer. Hov-
land, Jams, and Kelley (1953) have shown that the qualifica-
tions and perceived intentions of a communicator affect the
acceptance of his communications. Neiraark and Rosenberg
(1959) have shown that when a discriminative stimulus is
thought to be produced by another S in a two-choice situa-
tion, Ss' learning is retarded more than if it is thought to
be merely a warning signal.
In order to test the affect of expectation upon choices
in the game situation, instructions are used to induce a
9particular set. Ss are told either that their opponent Is
rational or that his choices are purely random. Combined
with the two strategies actually played against him, this
provides four instruction-strategy groups; rational-rational,
rational-random, random-rational , and random-random.
Instructions would not be expected to influence 3s'
playing against a consistent minimax opponent as much as they
would 3s' playing against a random opponent. It would seem
that if Ss are able to recognize a consistent minimax strat-
egy, as suggested above, instructions would have little ef-
fect. However, when the opponent is not obvious, such as
in
the random conditions, instructions should have more influ-
ence on a S's game behavior.
Value
The value of Lieberraan's game (Lieberraan, 1959) was zero.
Prom post-session interviews Lieberraan found that some Ss
claimed that they were willing to gamble on non-optimal
strate-ies because they stood to gain nothing by playing
their minimax. It seems that with low value games (e.g.,
Lieberman's zero-value) the utility of a 3' s choice of play
is not determined merely by the expected payoff of that
choice, but is a function of other factors such as
winning an
improbably high amount and the utility of gambling itself.
It is therefore possible that in higher value games
where the
assured payoff of a minimax choice is relatively
greater, the
10
utility of the non-monetary factors become relatively less
functional, thus motivating S to play his more conservative
miniraax choice. To test for this effect, the games used in
this study will include a range of ten values.
Summary
This study is an attempt to Investigate the proposition
that a person's choices in a game situation are a function of
his espectations of his opponent's choices and also the value
of the game. The S's expectation of his opponent's choices
are in turn a function of the instructions concerning the
opponent and 3's observation of his opponent's choices.
11
METHOD
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a 10x15x4 inch cardboard
box containing a 3x3 display of lights which indicated game
outcomes to S and E; 2 sets of 3 switches (1 set each for S
and E) with which to indicate choices of 3 and E; 2 8 xll
inch cardboard shields to prevent the players from seeing
their opponent's selections before the play was made; and a
pack of 270 game matrices on translucent tracing paper. The
games were similar in structure; all being strictly deter-
mined and generated from the basic game below:
Player B ( Experimenter )
bi b2 b3
Player A
ai
^2
= saddle point
11 -7 8
1 1* 2
-10 -7 21
The rows and columns of the basic game were permuted to
yield 9 similar games. In permuting rows and columns care
was taken that the saddle point fell once, and only once, in
each cell of the matrix. A constant of 1 was successively
added to each cell of the 9 permuted matrices until the
values of the games ranged from 1 to 10. This yielded 9x10
or 90 similarly structured games. Each f;ame was repeated
12
three times during the experimental session yielding a full
series of 9x10x3 or 270 games.
The games were constructed so as to afford each S three
types of pure strategies which on an a priori basis seeii.ed to
have high attraction for Ss: a miniraax strategy; a high-
average payoff strategy where the mean of the three cells of
a particular row was considerably higher than the mean of
either of the other two rows; and a row which contained the
highest single cell value of the matrix. Since at least one
cell in each of the S's rows yielded a higher payoff than a
cell in the same column of the other rows, none of the S's
rows could be logically eliminated on the basis that it con-
sistently yielded lower payoffs. The three pure strategies
were equally distributed over all three rows.
Procedure
Upon entering the experimental room, S was seated at a
table opposite E. Between them on the table was the box con-
taining the 3x3 display of lights. In front of each player
was the panel of three toggle switches and shield. The 3 was
then given $1.50 worth of poker chips with which to play the
games with the understanding that at the end of the session
he oould exchange whatever chips he had accumulated for money,
minus $1.00 of the original stake.
Instructions for the particular condition were read to
13
S as he followed along on his own copy. The instructions
for all conditions were identical except that for two condi-
tions ( rational-rational and rational-random) Ss were told
that inasmuch as E had to pay them each time they won, he
would play in such a way as to reduce their winnings. For
the other two conditions (random-random and random-rat ional
)
Ss were told that E's choices were completely random and had
been selected ahead of time.
Each of 100 Ss played E in a series of 270 games, 25 Ss
under each of the four conditions outlined above. E placed a
sheet of translucent tracing paper containing a game matrix
on the box in front of the players. S and E then examined
the game and indicated their choice of play by throwing the
appropriate toggle switch. S's task was to choose one of
three possible rows labeled a^, ag, or a^. E's task was to
choose one of three columns labeled b^, bg, or b^. When both
decisions had been made and the appropriate switches thrown,
the light in the box corresponding to that cell in the game
matrix which was the intersection of S's row and E's column
lighted up. The number of poker chips indicated by the
number in the activated cell was then given to or taken from
S. S's response was recorded by E and the next game placed
in position on the game box. This procedure was repeated
through all 270 games.
3. Instructions are presented in Appendix A.
Ik
^.uestionnalre
After playing the games, 3s were interviewed by E, The
interview was based on a questionnaire designed to attempt to
ascertain what strategies S thought he used and why, what
strategies he thought E had used, as well as such factors as
S's understanding of the rules of the game, how much he likes
gambling, and his motivation for winning.
Subjects
Subjects were 100 volunteer male undergraduate students
from the University of Massachusetts,
k. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
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HSSULTS
The 270 games played by each S were divided into nine
blocks of thirty trials. In each successive block of trials
the ten value levels were repeated three times. The basic
data for each of three analyses of variance (one for each of
S's three possible alternatives) were the number of choices
of a given alternative for each set of three trials at the
same value and trial block.
^
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the parallel analyses of
variance for miniraax, high-average, and high-cell choices
respectively. Examination of these tables discloses a con-
sistent pattern of significant effects. Strategy, value,
blocks, value by strategy, blocks by strategy, and value by
blocks are significant in all three analyses at the .05 level
or beyond. Instructions, instructions by strategy, and value
by blocks by strategy are significant at the .05 level or
beyond in the miniraax and high-average analyses.
The strategy chosen by E accounts for the largest pro-
portion of the total variability in all three analyses of
variance. Figure 1 represents the mean number of rainimax,
high-average, and high-cell choices per block of three trials
against a random or minimax strategy. When E played a random
5. Although three specific analyses of variance were
computed, it should be noted that they are not completely
dependent inasmuch as 3s only had three possible alternatl
1^
Table 1
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' Minimax Choices
Source of Variance
Degrees
of Preedora
Mean
Squares
Total
Between Ss
Instructions
Strategy
I X 3
Ss/I X S (1)
(I)
(S)
Within Ss
Value
Blocks
(V)
(B)
V X B
V X I
V X s
V X I X S
B X I
B X S
B X I X S
V X B X I
V X B X S
V X B X I X S
V X Ss/I X S (2)
B X Ss/I X S (3)
V X B X Ss/I X S ik)
8999
99
1
1
1
96
8900
9
8
72
9
9
9
8
8
8
72
72
72
864
768
6912
114.70
10,497.60
142.90
9.81
11.69**
1070.09**
14.56**
2.71 3.98**
21.38 23.23**
.44 1.69**
.72 1.05
1.62 2.38*
.38 .55
.31 .33
53.12 57.73**
1.11 1.20
.33 1.26
.46 1.76**
.30 1.15
.68
.92
.26
* p <.05 level of significance
** p <.01 level of significance
(1) Error terra for Instructions, Strategy, I x S
(2) Error term for Value, Vxl, VxS, VxIxS
(3) Error term for Blocks, Bxl, BxS, BxIxS
(4) Error term forVxB, VxBxI, VxBxS, VxBxIxS
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Table 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' High Average Choices
Source of Variance
Degrees
of Freedom
Mean
Squares P
Total
Between Ss
Instructions
Strategy
I X S
Ss/I X S (1)
Within Ss
Value (V)
Blocks (B)
(I)
(S)
V X B
V X I
V X S
V X I X S
B X I
B X S
B X I X S
V X B X I
V X B X S
V X B X I X S
V X Ss/I X S (2)
B X Ss/I X S (3)
V X B X Ss/I X S (i^)
8999
99
1
1
1
96
8900
9
8
n
9
9
9
8
8
8
72
72
72
B6k
768
6912
71.03
5906.52
75.53
13.31
5.33*
5.67*
6.0k 6.k9**
20.89 21.98**
.68 1
.
9^**
1.29 1.38
5.26 5.65**
.30 .32
.29 .30
29.68 31. 2i^**
1.07 1.12
AO 1.14
.61
.36 1.02
.93
.95
.35
* p<.05 level of significance
** p <.01 level of significance
(1) Error term for Instructions, Strategy, I x S
(2) Error terra for Value, V x I, V x S, V x I x S
(3) Error term for Blocks, Bxl, Bx3, BxIxS
(it-) Error terra forVxB, VxBxI, VxBxS, VxBxIxS
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Table 3
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' High Cell Choices
^ „ . Degrees MeanSource of Variance Freedom Sauares
Total 8999
Between Ss 99
.56Instructions (I) 1 5.30
Strategy (S) 1
^ ^ mt ^ ^655.60 70.26**
I X S 1 10.50 1.12
Ss/I X S (1) 96 9.33
Within Ss 8900
Value (V) 9 1.95 5.13**
Blocks (B) 8 ^.15 7.83**
V X B 72 .30 1.36*
V X I 9 .63
V X S 9 2.53 6.65**
V X I X S 9 .22 .57
B X I 8 .07 .13
B X S 8 9.07 17.11**
B X I X S 8 .11 .20
V X B X I 72 .27 1.22
V X B X S 72 .25 1.13
V X B X I X S 72 .24 i . uy
V X Ss/I X S (2) 86^ .38
B X Ss/I X S (3) 768 .53
V X B X Ss/I X S {k) 6912 .22
* p<.05 level of significance
** p<.01 level of significance
(1) Error term for Instructions, Strategy, I X S
(2) Error term for Value, V X I, V X S, V sc I X S
(3) Error terra for Blocks , 3 X I, B X S, B X I X S
{^) Error term for V x B, VxBxI, VxB X S, V X B X I X S
<O I-
o
J ro
J) LU
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30
2 5
2 0
I 5
I 0
CHOICES
A = MINIMAX
=HIGH AVERAGE
O =HIGH CELL
RANDOM RATIONAL
STRATEGY PLAYED BY E
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strategy, Ss played their minlmax alternative an average of
only .59 times in three games as contrasted with 2.7 times
against E« s rainimax strategy. The mean number of high-aver-
age and high-cell alternatives played by Ss were 1.8 and .59
out of three respectively when E played randomly, but only
.018 and .005 respectively for Ss against whom E played
miniraax.
All but one S playing against a miniraax strategy learned
to play their own miniraax. Playing against a random strategy
however, most Ss did not play any alternative consistently.
Two Ss did play the high average alternative consistently,
but the post-session interview disclosed that they realized
from the start that this choice would yield the highest over-
all expected payoff against a random strategist. Thus their
choices can not be attributed to a game learning process.
Against a random strategy Ss did, however, make more
high average choices than either of the other two alterna-
tives. All but one of the 25 Ss in the rational-random group,
and all but five Ss in the random-random group selected more
high-average than either of the other two choices. Pour of
these five Ss in the random-random group played more high-
cell than miniraax or high-average alternatives.
During the post-session interviews only two of the 50 Ss
who played against a miniraax-playing E described E's strategy
in terms of minimizing his losses. Other Ss simply described
the characteristics of E's choices. For example, they would
21
say, "You always played the column with the low numbers.",
or, "...the column with two minuses." Other Ss had diffi-
culty verbalizing E's choices, but when presented with a
series of games could indicate which choice E would make.
Pour Ss in the random-rational group claimed that E had
no strategy and one S wasn't sure. Upon questioning, all
five made statements to the effect, "You said you were ran-
dom. " When questioned as to whether or not they really be-
lieved ji played randomly, all replied, "Yes,
"
Of those Ss who played against a minimax strategy, 50!^
in the rational-rational and 53% in the random-rational
groups responded that E should have played differently in
order to minimize their winnings. Some Ss suggested that E
should have played randomly. Others suggested that he should
have made non-minimax choices once in a while in order to
force them from their minimax play. Most Ss claimed that
they played their minimax because E played his.
The value effect was significant beyond the .01 level on
all three analyses. The Ss showed a general tendency to play
more minimax and high-cell choices for higher value games
than for lower value games. They tended to play more high-
average choices for lower value games than for higher value
game s *
A clearer picture of the value effect can be seen by
looking at its interaction with the strategy played by E.
The value by strategy effect was significant beyond the .01
22
level on the high-average and high-cell analyses, and the .05
level on the ininimax analysis. Figure 2 presents the mean
number of alternative choices across the 10 value levels
against a miniraax or random strategy. The value of a game
has relatively little effect on S's choices when E consis-
tently plays a minimax strategy. When, however, E plays ran-
domly, the value effects mentioned above become accentuated.
The blocks and blocks by strategy effects were signifi-
cant beyond the .01 level on all three analyses. Disregard-
ing the strategy played against them, Ss selected an in-
creasing number of miniraax alternatives over blocks of trials
and a decreasing number of high-average and high-cell choices.
However, the strategy played against 3s dramatically effected
their choices over blocks. Figure 3 presents the mean number
of alternative choices per block of trials against random or
minimax strategies. When E played a minimax strategy, Ss
played an increasing number of minimax choices over blocks
and a decreasing number of high-average and high-cell choices.
When E played a random strategy, Ss played an increasing num-
ber of high-average alternatives for the first 60 games and
then fewer over the remaining 210 games. The curve for the
number of minimax choices played by 3s shows a fluctuating
decline over the 270 games, while the high-cell choices show
an initial decline over the first 90 games but an increase
over the last 180.
Although the value by trials interaction proved to be
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significant beyond the .05 level for high-cell choices and
the .01 level for high-average and minimax choices, the value
by trials by strategy interaction gives a truer picture of
this effect inasmuch as the nature of the value by trials
interaction is very much dependent upon the strategy played
by E. The value by trials by strategy interaction was sig-
nificant beyond the .01 level on both the minimax and high-
average analyses, but not significant on the high-cell
analysis.
Against either a minimax or random strategy, Ss initi-
ally made more minimax choices for high value games than for
lovf values. Against a minimax strategy, however, they in-
creased their number of minimax choices over trials, while
decreasing them against a random strategy. In both cases the
rate of increase or decrease is greater for higher than lower
value games during the early trials, but after 60 to 120
games the differences in these rates between high and low
value games is negligible.
Against either a minimax or a random strategy, 3s initi-
ally made more high average choices for lower value games
than higher value ones. Against a random strategy, however,
Ss increased their number of high average choices for the
first 60 to 90 games and then showed a slow decrease over the
remainder of the games. Against a minimax strategy, they
showed an immediate and sharp decrease. In both cases the
initial increase or decrease was greater for lower than
26
higher value games. The slow decline against a random strat-
egy was somewhat greater for higher than lovrer value games.
After 90 to 120 games against a minimax strategy, the differ-
ences between low and high value games were negligible.
The instructions effect was significant at the .05 level
on the high-average analysis and the .01 level on the minimax.
Figure ka. presents the mean number of minimax and high-aver-
age choices per block of three trials for the two instruction
groups. The Ss played more minimax and fewer high-average
alternatives when told that their opponent was rational than
when told he was playing randomly.
Figure ^b presents the mean number of minimax and high-
average choices for the two instruction groups against random
and minimax strategies. It is evident from Pig\ires ka and 4b
that instructions were effective only when a random strategy
was played against 3s. Inspection of Figure 4b also indi-
cates that against a minimax strategy Ss made more minimax
choices and against a random strategy, more high-average
choices regardless of the instructions given them.
Questionnaire results relevant to the instructional set
given to the Ss show that 13 out of 25 Ss in the rational-
random group stated that they thought that E had a strategy,
eight said he had no strategy, and four didn't know. Seven
Ss in the random-random group stated that _a had a strategy,
15 said no, and three didn't know.
Twenty- three Ss in the rational-random group mixed their
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choices relying on no alternative in particular. Two Ss in
this group, although playing a mixture of all three alterna-
tives, relied most heavily on high-average choices. Ten Ss
in the random-random group played a mixed strategy, while 11
played a mixed strategy which relied heavily on high-average
choices.
Nine Ss in the rational-random group indicated they
thought ^'s choices depended on what they played, as opposed
to none in the random-random group. Seventeen Ss in the
rational
-random group indicated that E tried to influence
their choices by making certain choices of his own compared
to three in the random-random group.
Seventeen Ss in the rational-random group claimed that
their choices depended upon S's choices as contrasted to four
Se in the random-random group. Eight Ss in the rational-
random group stated that they tried to influence E's playing
by making certain choices of their own compared to one S in
the random-random group.
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DISCUSSION
In the present study the strategy played against S was
the strongest single factor determining how he played. Exam-
ination of the data suggests two possible explanations for
this effect: discrimination and imitation. Against a consis-
tent strategy, such as a miniraax strategy, Ss learned to play
a consistent counter strategy. The games employed in this
study were such that if 3 played any alternative but his
miniraax when playing against a miniraax strategist, he lost
chips. Against a rainimax playing opponent, then, the task
might be considered a straightforward discrimination problem;
play miniraax and win, play anything else and lose. Such a
task does not require 3s to concentrate on what their oppo-
nent plays, only on those characteristics which discriminate
their own miniraax row. This explanation is supported by the
fact that many Ss in the rational-rational and random-ration-
al groups either were unable to verbalize their opponent's
strategy or claimed a had no strategy despite the fact that
all but one of them learned to play a minlmax strategy con-
sistently. It is suggested that if games were employed in
which non-miniraax choices did not necessarily lead to a loss
of chips, the discrimination task would not be as simple and
Ss might not as easily learn the minimax solution.
In further support of the above explanation, over half
of the Ss playing against a minimax strategist claimed E
played unwisely. It Is apparent that these Ss did not learn
the rationale for a minimax solution. Perhaps if the task
were less mechanical, requiring Ss to concentrate on the out-
comes of the various combinations of alternatives, more of
them would have learned the rationale of a minimax solution.
A game situation in which two Ss play against each other
would require greater concentration on the task and also pro-
vide experience of outcomes of alternatives other than mini-
max. Lieberman (1953, 1959) found that Ss playing each other
a single game did learn to play minimax in 90 to 150 trials.
However, the solution was always the same, either row 3 or
column 3. A series of similar games in which the minimax
alternative varied over the three rows and columns would re-
quire the Ss to generalize their strategy to other games.
Against a random strategy, Ss were not consistently re-
warded or punished for choosing any particular alternative.
Therefore, Ss would not be expected to learn to play any al-
ternative consistently. Over a number of trials, however,
they should have accumulated more chips by playing their
high-average alternative. This might explain why Ss playing
against a random strategy, in general, made more high-average
than minimax or high-cell choices. Also the high-average row
provided a two-thirds chance of winning a middle range value
payoff, compared to a sure but low value payoff for the mini-
max row, and one-third chance of winning a high value payoff
for choosing the high-cell alternative. It is possible that
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Ss were attracted to the favorable two-thirds probability of
the high-average alternative. A test for this suggestion
would be to provide games in which the high-average row has
only a one- third chance of winning.
The second possible explanation for the strategy effect
is that Ss attempted to imitate their opponent's strategy.
Evidence from two-choioe situations which involve S's pre-
dicting which of two discrete events will occur In each of a
series of trials, have demonstrated a strong tendency on the
part of Ss to estimate closely the probability of each
event's occurring. Since against the rational-rational and
randoiD-rational groups E always played his miniraax, those Ss
would be expected to learn to play their minlmax, i.e.,
"match" E's play, after an initial period where they learned
to discriminate the characteristics of £*s choice and the
fact that he never deviated from that choice. That Ss were
able to discriminate E's choice, though perhaps not being
able to verbalize it, was demonstrated during the interview
where most Ss were able to indicate what E's choice would be
6
on any given trial. Against a randomly playing opponent Ss
would not be expected to play any consistent alternative
since E did not play a consistent alternative.
It is possible in these terms to consider the Ss in the
6. This is consistent with evidence from concept forma-
tion research (e.g., Mair, 1931; Hees and Israel, 1935) which
has demonstrated that Ss are often able to perform tasks ade-
quately without being able to verbalize their solution.
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present study to have imitated or "matched" E's behavior by
approaching In their choices of mlnimax rows, the frequency
with which E chose the minimax column, i.e., one hundred per-
cent of the choices. This would apply to those 50 Ss who
played against a minimax-playing E. Since E consistently
chose the minimax column, no test is possible among these Ss
of whether their minimax choices would Increase or decrease
with increases or decreases in S's minimax choices.
The data of the 50 Ss who played against a random-play-
ing a do provide a basis for crudely testing the "matching"
hypothesis, since E's choice of minimax columns did vary from
one block of 30 trials to another (see Figure 5). When the
Ss* mean number of minimax choices is comijared with the num-
ber of times E played his miniruax alternative in the pre-
ceding block, Ss generally increased their minimax choices
when E had increased his minimax choices and decreased when E
decreased. The "matching" effect is also suggested by simi-
lar inspection of block by block choices for the high-average
alternative.
The fact that the strategy played against Ss is such a
powerful determinant of their choices suggests that a sys-
tematic manipulation of various strategies might be carried
out. Would Ss learn to play a consistent strategy against a
consistent strategy other than a minimax, for example a con-
sistent high-average strategy? Also, various percentages of
rainlmeLX choices might be employed to ascertain at what level
in O lo o
snvmi o£ do >iDona d3d
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Ss no longer played a consistent rainimax solution. Whether
Ss would attempt to match the percentage of miniraax choices
played against them as suggested by the evidence from two-
choice studies, or if such a situation would provide enough
experience with the consequences of non-rainimax alternatives
that they learn the rationale for minimax play is yet to be
empirically determined.
Against a random-playing opponent the decline of the
high-average choices and increases of high-cell choices over
the later blocks might be attributed, in part to tiie possi-
bility that 3s initially played high-average alternatives in
order to accumulate a store of chips. Once they were secure
in the amount of chips accumulated, they could afford to play
the high-paying, high-risk, high-cell alternative instead of
the high-average.
It is apparent that when Ss are sure of their opponent's
strategy factors such as the value of the game and instruc-
tions have very little effect. t</hen, however, an opponent's
strategy is highly ambiguous (e.g., random) such factors do
effect Ss choices.
Figure 6 shows the number of times E played each of his
alternatives at each value level. A comparison of Figures 2
and 6 indicates that Ss had some success in predicting E's
minimax choices, but little in predicting his high-average or
high-cell choices.
The similarity between Ss' and E's minimax choice
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patterns raises some doubt as to whether Ss played rainimax
more often for higher value games because higher values were
more attractive or because they were able to predict E's
choices. A closer examination of the results would indicate
that the former is generally true, but the latter is true for
later games.
The value by blocks by strategy interaction showed that
Ss initially chose more rainimax alternatives for higher value
games than for lower value games. This would support the
contention that when an opponent's strategy was ambiguous,
for example in the early games before Ss had a chance to
estimate how often E played his miniraax, Ss played more raini-
max for higher value games than for lower value games. In
later games, after they had a chance to observe E's behavior,
they apparently attempted to predict his rainimax choices.
For higher value games Ss played more conservatively
(minimax) and at the same time took more risks (high cell)
than they did for lower value games. Apparently the magni-
tude of the high-cell and the assured positive payoffs of the
rainimax choices became relatively more attractive compared to
the negative-to-middle range payoffs offered by the high-
average choice. It appears that for low value games where Ss
had to risk too much in making high-cell choices and where
the assured payoff of the miniraax choice was negligible, Ss
preferred to make high-average choices which afforded a two-
thirds chance of winning. For higher value games the
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probability of a middle range payoff became relatively less
attractive compared to the relatively hi,;h, sure win of the
minimax and the relatively low-risk, hi^^h-payoff , high-cell.
Suppes and Atkinson's (I960) demonstration that 3s in a
two-choice situation tend more toward an optimal play for
games involving relatively higher payoffs is consistent with
the findings of this study that Ss play more minimax alterna-
tives for higher value games. The results of this study con-
cerning the affect of relative values on high-cell choices
indicates the need for further research involving games in
which the relative risk of the high-cell alternative in-
creases or remains constant as the value of the payoff in-
creases,
instructions also proved to be influential on Ss'
choices only when E played randomly. Questionnaire results
indicated that under this condition different Instructions
induced somewhat different concepts of 3s' opponent. Since
fi's choices against the rational-random and random-random
groups were identical, the S's choice differences in these
two groups must be attributed to the instructions given them.
The fact that Ss in the random-random group relied more
heavily on high-average choices than did Ss in the rational-
random group may, in part, be explained by the evidence from
the questionnaire which indicated that the 3s in the former
group were less prone to be influenced by and to look for
patterns in E's choices than were Ss in the latter group. It
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Is possible that the former Ss were more attracted to the
high-average alternative because it provided a two-thirds
chance of winning a middle range payoff as opposed to a two-
thirds chance of losing by playing a high-cell alternative,
or winning a small payoff by playing a miniraax alternative.
On the other hand, Ss who expected E to be playing some sort
of strategy might not be as attracted to the high-average
alternative because they were more concerned with looking for
a pattern in E's choices.
The payoffs in this study were in terms of poker chips
which in turn were transferable for money. Game theory, how-
ever, as presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), de-
fines payoffs in terras of utilities. Thus poker chips in
this study are used as approximations of utilities. To the
degree that these approximations are adequate, the results of
this study are not restricted to monetary payoffs, but may
extend to any situation, be it economic, military, political,
or social, where decisions can be translated into game theory
language and payoffs into some approximation of utilities.
For example in military parlance, cell payoffs may be defined
in terms of number of troops and equipment lost or destroyed,
winning or losing of battles, the amount of time needed for
delaying tactics, etc. In political situations utilities may
be in terras of war or not war, making friends of foreign
countries, loss or gain of prestige, etc. With regard to
social situations, utilities may be in terms of gain or loss
39
status, opportunity to meet new or influential people,
isfaction derived from various social interactions, etc.
^0
SUMMARY
Although there has been considerable interest in deci-
sion making and the application of game theory models to cer-
tain psychological problems in recent years, there has been
little Investigation of the variables influencing game behav-
lor. This study was an attempt to investigate some of these
variables affecting the playing of two-person strictly deter-
mined games. The major questions asked were:
1. Vvhen playing a series of similarly structured,
strictly determined games, do intelligent persons learn to
make strategy choices consistent with deductions from a game
theoretic model?
2. How does the strategy played against an individual
influence the strategy he employs?
3. How does an individual's expectation of his oppo-
nent's strategy influence his own strategy?
^. Do intelligent persons play high value games differ-
ently than they play low value games?
5. How do intelligent persons modify their strategy with
experience?
One hundred Ss were assigned to one of four conditions;
rational-rational, rational
-random, random-rational, or
random-random,
.^ach 3 was told in everyday language either
that his opponent would play randomly or in such a way as to
minimize S's winnings. Rither a minimax or a random strategy
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was played against hira. i^ach S played a series of 270 simi-
larly structured 3x3 strictly determined games against E.
The series contained 10 value levels from one through 10. Ss
were provided with three types of choices: a minimax in which
the row contained the saddle point of the game, a high aver-
age in which the average of values in the cells of that row
was higher than of any other row. and a high cell in which
that row contained the highest valued cell of the game matrix.
The spatial ordering of these choices in the matrix was
varied unsystematically from game to game. The particular
choice made by each 3 for each game was recorded. Three
analyses of variance were computed, one for each class of 3s'
choices.
Results from this study are generally consistent with
deductions from the game theoretic model employed. The
strategy played against 3s proved to be the most potent fac-
tor affecting: their choices. When playing against a consis-
tently minii.iax-playing opponent, 3s learned quickly to play a
minimax strategy themselves. When playing against a random
strategy, Ss did not learn to play any one strategy consis-
tently, but relied most heavily on high average choices which
produced the highest monetary yields. Against a random oppo-
nent, Ss also were affected by other factors such as the
value of the game and their expectations of their opponent as
presented to them through instructions.
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APPENDIX A
IWSTHUCTTnM.<;
Play
^nt^Uigii^fyl^^Si^J^^ 'tnT °' ^^'"^^ ^'^1°^. if youWin will depSnd u^on'^how wSu you nf.r?;^' amount y^u"the games you wllS: be pla^n^ agaiS^'^n.e
You are plaver* "A" anrt t «
Will have a gWZtrL oS tL box tf? "K' ^'^^^ S^^e wegame matrices I and II below. similar to
game matrix I
C
H
0
0 I
It
S
^2 "3
11
-7 8
1 1 2
*3
j
-10 21
game matrix II
Y
0
U
B
C
H
0
I
C
E
S
ai
ar>
-7
1
*
25 -6 0
^1 1 2
can wiS^o^^Siron^fJ^f °^^if ^^P^^sent how many chips you
la to'seUofohlir(?f*
^'Jj:? :*"•/">"• task 1„ each gameindicate your choio« k* ^2. or a-.. rou then
ward InLmuch'^s'^^ H ZZVl'^.n' K -T^o.-
ll °'^.^3- Neither you no? ! will 'J St f^^®°^ b,,other is-'choosing before ?L m 4 ® see what the^combination of
-a" a„d fv.^i^^ '^^^ particular
mine which cell in ?hf K ^^'^ ^ choose will detert e matrix will light up on the box ^n
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front of us. You will win or lose the number of chips indi-
cated in the corresponding cell of the game matrix.
As an example, in game matrix I above (turn back and
look at game matrix I), if you choose row ai, and I choose
column hi, you would win 11 chips. If, on the other hand,
you choose a^, and I choose bg, you would lose seven chips.
When we have played a game, I will tell you to return
your switch to the "off" position (back — toward you). I
will then give to you or take from you the number of chips
indicated on that play. We will then go on to the next game
matrix and you will make another choice of a^, ap, or a-j. I
will also make another choice of bi, b2, or b3.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS SO PAR?
Instructions For Rational Groups
Remember your task is to win as many chips as you can.
You are playing against me. Inasmuch as I have to pay you
each time you win, I will try to play in such a way as to
reduce your winnings.
Instructions For Random Groups
Remember, your task is to win as many chips as you can.
You are playing against me. However, I am not really com-
peting with you. My choices for each game have already been
decided before heind. No matter what your choices are, I will
not change my choices which have already been selected. I am
a purely chance or random opponent. That is, in making my
choices ahead of time I did not consider the nature of the
games. When I made ray choices I simply reached into a hat
blindly and pulled out a number from 1 to 3 to determine what
choice I would play for any particular game. In every game
choices b,
,
b2, or b3 all have an equal chance of being
played by me.
ANY QUESTIO?JS ABOUT WHAT I MEAN WHEN I SAY THAT I AH A
PUliELY CHANCE OR RANDOM OPPONENT?
ANY QUESTIONS SO PAR?
In front of you is II.50 worth of poker chips.
1 white chip » 1/10 of a cent » 1 point in the game matrix
1 red chip « 10 white chips = 1 cent
1 blue chip = 10 red chips = 100 white chips =« 10 cents
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At the end of the games you will give back to rae i^l.OO
worth of chips and I will give you money for the rest of the
chips which you have accumulated. Thus, if you just break
even in the games you will receive $.50 for showing up (the$.50 you did not give back to rae). If you should lose at thegames you may lose all or any part of that $.50. You can
not, of course, lose any of your own money. You can however
win more than v. 50. This experiment is being sponsored by a
research foundation so don't be afraid to win as much as you
can.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Remember, in each game you choose row a-,, a?, or a-a.
Then throw switch a^L* ^2* ^r ao corresponding to your choice.
I will similarly choose column bn, bp, or bq. The combina-
tion of our choices will be indicated by on§ of the lights on
the box in front of us. You will win or lose the number of
chips indicated in the corresponding cell of your game matrix.
We will then go on to the next game matrix and make our
choices for that game.
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE
Do you like to gamble?
yes no
Do you know anything about the theory of games?
yes no
If yes, where did you le&m what you know?
If yes, do you think it helped you in playing the games?
yes no
Do you know anything about probability theory?
yes no
If yes, do you think it helped you in playing the games?
yes no
Were the instructions concerning what you were to do
clear to you?
yes no
If no, what was unclear?
VIere the instructions concerning what I was ffoin? to do
clear to you?
yes no
If no, what was unclear?
Were there anything in the instructions that were not
clear?
yes no
If yes, what?
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Did the Instructions concerning how I was going to Dlavthe games help or hinder you in deciding how to play thegames? ^
help hinder no ?
If I had told you that I was going to play (rationally,
randomly) would you have played differently?
yes no ?
If yes, how?
In making a choice of play was your choice based pri-
marily on how many chips you could win if you playedintelligently (as opposed to the desire to ramble for
example)
yes no mostly
Any other factors involved? If so, what?
How did you play the games? What strategies did you use?
mm X HC mixed
Did your strategy change at all during the games, i.e..did you use more than one strategy?
yes no
If yes, why?
If yes, describe those strategies not already described,
and when you used one in preference to another?
Did your choices depend upon what choices I was making?
yes no
During the games did you try to influence my choices by
making certain choices of your own?
yes no
If yes, describe what you did?
Now that the games are over do you think there was anybest strategy?
yes no ?
If yes, what was it?
^9
15. Did I have a strateffv*? finw t t odid I use? ^ Pl^^? What strategy ( ies)
yes no
16. Did n,y strategy change at all during the games?
yes no ?
17. Did ™y Choices depend upon wh«t choices you were „aMngT
yes no ?
yes no ?
19. Do you feel that the games were fair?
yes no
If no, in what way were they not fair?
20. Do you think that I played fairly with you?
yes no
If no, in What way do you think I played unfairly?
If no, did this effect the way you played the ga.es.
21. Are you satisfied with the way you played the ga.es?
yes no
If no, in what way are you not satisfied?
22. Did you enjoy playing the games?
yes no
Why? (Why not?)
-p"^?iSt\%1iJJ''LL°„|^;a-t participating 1„ this
yes^ no
If no, why not?
Thank you very much for your time.


